Citation: Koutrakos, P. (2012). The European Union's common foreign and security policy 
Introduction
The European Union has been going through a long group therapy process since the with very little coordination, and in a way which deprived the Union of both clarity as to its policies, and clout as to its presence. Indeed, the Mandate of the 2007
Intergovernmental Conference which led to the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty mentioned coherence as an imperative for the EU's foreign affairs in its very first paragraph. 5 In addition to these concerns, the new Treaty aimed to meet the ambitions which the Union had been articulating in the last ten years. The European Security
Strategy, for instance, states that 'Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world'. 6 The Union's institutions have been tireless in their praise for the significance of the new provisions. Acording to the European Council, the Lisbon Treaty 'will bring increased efficiency to our external action'. 7 In its Opinion on the 2007
Intergovernmental Conference, the European Commission stated that the latter 'will
give Europe a clear voice in relations with our partners worldwide, and sharpen the impact and visibility of our message … This will mean an EU able to play a more responsive and effective part in global affairs'. 8 And President Sarkozy of France wrote during the Russia-Georgia crisis in August 2008 that, had the new Treaty entered into force, the Union would have had the institutions it needed in order to cope better with international crisis. It is against this background that this Chapter focuses on the main changes introduced at Lisbon in relation to the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It is structured as follows. First, it examines the structural changes introduced at Lisbon, and assesses them in the light of their declared objectives as well as the broader constitutional context set out by the Treaties. Second, it analyses the institutional innovations, with special emphasis on the High Representative, and the European External Action Service.
Third, it focuses on CSDP, an area of increasing topicality on which the Lisbon Treaty puts considerable emphasis.
Structural changes
There are two main changes in the structure of the system of EU foreign affairs, namely the abolition of the pillar structure, and the re-organisation of all the external policies of the Union within a unitary system of principles and objectives.
The pillar structure of the Union has been a constant since the Maastricht Treaty. It divided the activities of the Union in three distinct sets of rules, the European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (the latter succeeding the Justice and Home Affairs framework originally established at Maastricht). The logic of the pillar structure was simple: the Member States want to cooperate in a wide range of areas (economic, political, social, criminal), albeit at a differing pace, following different models of integration, decision-making and judicial control, all depending on the political sensitivity of the subject-matter in question. Viewed from this angle, the pillar-structure conveyed this reality clearly: CFSP, for instance, was deemed so central to the core of the sovereignty of the Member States that the legal framework set out in the old second pillar (ex Title V TEU) was organised on the basis of predominantly intergovernmental features: decision-making was mainly by unanimity, the CFSP measures were distinct from those adopted pursuant to the traditional Community method, the Court of Justice was expressly excluded from exercising its jurisdiction over such measures, the Commission did not have the exclusive right of legislative initiative, and the role of the Parliament was peripheral at most.
However, the coexistence of different sets of rules made the Union legal system complex and, to outside observers, puzzling. This was exacerbated by the existence of legal linkages between them. The Union was based on a single institutional framework, 10 and the Council and the Commission were responsible for ensuring the consistency between the various external policies, irrespective of the legal framework within which they were carried out. 11 Therefore, whilst governed by distinct sets of rules which differed considerably in their legal effects, the pillars were viewed as part of a functional whole, the life of which depended on the interactions between a single set of institutions, which would exercise different powers depending on whether they acted under the first or the second pillar.
The Lisbon Treaty dealt with the complexities raised by the co-existence of distinct, However, to what extent has the formal abolition of the pillars given rise to a truly integrated legal order? Has it established a framework where foreign policy is carried out on the basis of similar rules as the other Union's external policies? Or has it merely abolished the appearance of separate sets of rules, whilst in reality maintaining the distinct characteristics of CFSP?
As far as the old third pillar is concerned, there is no doubt that it has been fully integrated within the Union legal order, hence its distinct pillar structure abolished both formally and substantively. 13 The CFSP framework, however, maintains its very distinct legal character which differentiates it from all other EU external policies. The above brief overview suggests that the Lisbon Treaty abolishes the pillar structure only in name. Indeed, it transposes the previous set of rules in a unitary structure, with all its legal characteristics intact. This is explained by the logic of the pillar structure which still permeates the Union constitutional order as set out at Lisbon: whilst Member States are determined to broaden the scope of their cooperation in areas deemed to be closer to the functions traditionally carried out by
States, and whilst they deem it sensible to rely upon institutions and processes of what used to be the Community legal order, they wish to do so at a different pace, in accordance with a different model of integration, and in order to achieve qualitatively different objectives. It was this fundamental differentiation that the establishment of the complex pillar structure sought to convey, and the abolition of the appearance of that structure by no means makes it any less valid or present. Similarly, whilst the previous pillar-structure was viewed as complex, the removal of the appearance of complexity does not necessarily make the new legal structure any easier to manage.
The second structural change introduced at Lisbon is the reorganisation of all the EU set out in different parts of primary law, each carried out in order to pursue its specific objectives, the Lisbon Treaty brings them together, and lays down a set of common principles and objectives which all these policies should pursue, irrespective of their specific legal characteristics.
The principles are set out in Article 21(1) TEU and include, rather predictably, democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The objectives are set out in Article 21(2) TEU and are noteworthy for both their range and ambition:
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; Whilst the 'depillarization' of the Union seeks to signify the formal integration of its foreign affairs system, the above provisions aim to bring about its substantive integration. To that effect, the Lisbon Treaty introduces the term 'external action', rather than 'external relations' or 'policies', which covers all external economic, political and security strands. This term, and the singular in which it is couched, signifies the design, and therefore conduct, of the Union's foreign affairs as a coherent whole. As it relates to all the different facets of the Union's international posture, it reflects their singular focus. This is yet another indication that, in the process of European integration and the drafting of the relevant primary rules, semantics matter.
Institutional changes
The Lisbon Treaty has a visible impact on the institutional machinery of the Union in the area of foreign affairs by establishing the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs ad Security Policy, and assigning to it a new service, the European External Action Service (EEAS).
The aim of this innovation is to provide the Union's foreign affairs with a face. By providing an answer to the perennial question which Henry Kissinger is purported to have raised, this new post is also intended to facilitate the coherence of external policies and provide a single point of contact. Under the Constitutional Treaty, the post holder would have had a different title, namely Minister for Foreign Affairs.
However, this proved to be controversial, as it was a title associated with States. However, a closer look reveals a more nuanced picture. Three observations are worth making. First, the Treaty is strikingly vague about the role of the High Representative.
Whilst it is stated that she is responsible for the conduct of CFSP, 35 The input of the Parliament turned out to be the second controversial issue as, in addition to the above, the only directly elected Union institution was keen to underline the political accountability of EEAS and ensure that the latter would not be diluted by the management structure of the Service. One of the issues about which it felt strongly was to ensure that the person deputising for the High Representative before the Parliament would be politically accountable, and not an official. In order to appreciate its role in the establishment of the EEAS, it is recalled that, whilst required only to be consulted on the establishment of the Service, 44 the Parliament is to give its consent to the amendments of the Staff and Financial Regulations which are necessary for the EEAS to become operational. Therefore, not for the first time following the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament saw it fit to flex its muscle. from the rotating Presidency (or the trio Presidencies) depending on the subject matter of discussion.
Whether the compromise outlined above is workable remains to be seen. 51 For the purpose of this analysis, suffice it to point out its vague language, the complex arrangements it sets out, and its underlying effort to strike the balance between In terms of substantive content, the Lisbon Treaty expands the range of activities which fall within the scope of CSDP, albeit merely formalising existing practice. 54 In the light of the limited length of this chapter, the following analysis focuses on three specific issues, namely military capabilities, flexibility, and the mutual assistance clause. These are the most interesting changes introduced at Lisbon in this area.
Military capabilities
The ambition of the Union to play an important security role in the world, and the range of missions it has carried out has brought to the fore the issue of military capabilities. Following the end of the Cold War, the European defence industries have been facing very serious problems (including underfunding, shortages in certain areas and oversupply in others, insufficient funding of research and development), and the financial crisis has imposed further constraints on national defence budgets. The 54 Art. 43(1) TEU provides that the CSDP tasks shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. It also provides that '[a]ll these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.
perilous state of the defence capabilities in Europe was highlighted with brutal honesty in a widely discussed speech by the then outgoing United States Defence
Secretary Gate on the future of NATO in which he referred to 'the very real possibility of collective military irrelevance'.
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The emphasis which the Lisbon Treaty places on this aspect of security policy is illustrated in two ways. First, it imposes a duty on Member States to 'make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council'.
56
Second, it provides for a special intergovernmental body, namely the European Defence Agency (EDA) which is intended to be active in the area of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition, and armaments.
57
Both developments are actually less spectacular in their implications than they might appear at first sight. On the one hand, whilst suggesting a degree of impetus in this area, the duty imposed on Member States is vague in its scope, and silent in its implications. Most importantly, it needs to be considered in the light of the numerous reminders in the Treaty and its attached Declarations that the Member States are the locus for the organisation of their defence. 58 Viewed from this angle, the provision of Article 42(3) TEU is more interesting at the level of semantics, rather than substance.
55 Speech delivered on 10 June: http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/search/gates%20nato%20future/?s=gates+nato+future (last accessed on 30 June 2011) 56 Art. 42(3) TEU which also provides that Member States 'shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities'. 57 Art. 42(3) second subpara. TEU provides that EDA 'shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities'. See also Art. 45 TEU. 58 See, for instance, Declarations 13 and 14 concerning the common foreign and security policy.
As for the EDA, its story provides a useful reminder of the limits of legal rules. In fact, it was established in 2004, that is well before the Lisbon Treaty was even drafted, and even before it became clear that the Constitutional Treaty was dead. 59 Furthermore, whilst the work that the Agency has been doing is largely positive, sensible and well-received, it is also limited in its scope, and has been marred by disagreements between Member States as to its approach (whether it should focus on developing synergies in order to deal with short term issues, or long term projects), and budget.
It is noteworthy that, in the area of defence industries more generally, the more important developments originate beyond the Lisbon Treaty altogether. After a series of initiatives assessing the serious economic problems facing the European defence industries, 60 and advocating the adoption of a wide range of measures, 61 The above does not mean to suggest that the provision of Article 42(7) TUE is not significant. On the one hand, it is a specific illustration of political solidarity, one of the main pillars of CFSP as laid down in Article 24(3) TEU. As such, it may appear to merely state the obvious. However, when it comes to the Union's foreign policy, the obvious often needs to be stated. It is recalled that, when Greece claimed that its past, and the practical problems which have hampered the development of a truly effective security policy will not simply evaporate. As all these form part and parcel of the Union's deeply idiosyncratic constitutional set up, they will continue to affect the conduct of foreign affairs, albeit in the revamped framework set out by the Lisbon Treaty.
In effect, this analysis of the Lisbon Treaty illustrates the limits of primary legal rules.
Another way of making this point is to notice what the Treaty fails to mention. In the area of external economic relations, for instance, there is no reference to the duty of cooperation. This has been developed by the Court of Justice over the years as binding both the EU institutions and the Member States in the process of negotiation, conclusion and application of mixed agreements. 76 As it refers to areas where the EU shares competence with its Member States, this duty is central to the conduct of EU external action. It has become a central constitutional principle which governs the complex and multilayered system of EU external relations. And yet, the Lisbon Treaty which purports to streamline and organise this system fails to mention it in this context. However, this will by no means render the principle any less important, neither will it prevent the Court from developing further its interpretation. 
